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NOTES & COMMENTS
HIT MAN: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S MISTAKE IN
RICE V. PALADIN ENTERS., INC.
"If there is a bedrock principle of the First Amendment, it is that
the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea sim-
ply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able. ,,
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early hours of March 3, 1993, James Edward Perry broke into
the Maryland home of Mildred Horn.' Once inside, he killed Mrs. Horn,
her eight year-old quadriplegic son Trevor, and Trevor's nurse, Janice
Saunders. Perry acted as a contract killer, a "hit man," hired by Mildred
Horn's ex-husband Lawrence Horn, to murder the family so that Lawrence
would inherit the $1.7 million medical malpractice settlement for injuries
that left Trevor paralyzed for life.4 Perry is currently on death row in
Maryland and Lawrence Horn is serving life in prison without parole.'
In an unprecedented decision, the Fourth Circuit United States Court
of Appeals in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,6 permitted the victims'
families to sue Paladin Press, the publisher of the book entitled Hit Man: A
Technical Guide for Independent Contractors,7 for aiding and abetting the
crime.' The Fourth Circuit found that Perry plotted out the slayings by
following the book's detailed instructions on how to commit murder and
how to avoid being caught. 9 Reversing a prior summary judgment in the
publisher's favor, the court held that the information in the book could fall
1. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the
opinion of the Court. Id at 398.
2. John Gibeaut, Deadly Advice Targeted Decision Allows Suit Against Publisher of Mur-




6. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1515 (1998).
7. REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL GUIDE FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (1983).
8. Rice, 128 F.3d at 233.
9. Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 24.
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outside First Amendment protection. 0 Although it attempted to fashion a
narrow decision," the Fourth Circuit dealt a striking blow to First Amend-
ment privileges and created the possibility of extending liability to those
who disseminate precarious information to the public.
In April 1998, the United States Supreme Court refused to disturb the
Fourth Circuit's decision. 12 The Court's refusal to hear the case suggests
that the publisher and its president, Peter C. Lund, could stand civilly liable
in the wrongful death action. 3 By denying certiorari, the Court also failed
to resolve the circuit split on whether the First Amendment protects those
who publish detailed instructions for illegal or dangerous activities from
civil liability.14
This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rice ignored
important Supreme Court standards and abandoned the fundamental princi-
ples underlying First Amendment protection. In the landmark case of
Brandenburg v. Ohio,'5 the Court found that the First Amendment pro-
tected the abstract advocacy of lawlessness except when that advocacy was
intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action.' 6 This Note argues
that although the Fourth Circuit recognized this standard, it refused to ap-
ply the test. Urged by the Attorney General and Department of Justice, the
court instead relied on a small number of criminal cases 17 and previously
failed federal legislation" to support its conclusion.' 9
Part II outlines several theories addressing the benefits of free speech
and enumerates the areas of unprotected speech. This Part also considers
the standard most applicable to Hit Man. Part III analyzes the appellate de-
cision in light of the lower court's ruling. Part IV critiques the Fourth Cir-
10. Rice, 128 F.3d at 233.
1. Id. at 266-67. "A decision that Paladin may be liable under the circumstances of this
case is not even tantamount to a holding that all publishers... may be liable .. " Id.
12. Paladin Enters., Inc. v. Rice, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
13. Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 24.
14. Id.; see, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that publisher of an article describing how to perform autoerotic asphyxia could not be held civ-
illy liable for inciting the death of a teenager); see also discussion infra Part IV.D.
15. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 447.
17. Rice, 128 F.3d at 245 (citing United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990));
United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kelley, 769
F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Buttorf! 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 1978)).
18. See Prohibition on Dissemination of Information Relating to Explosive Materials for a
Criminal Purpose, S. 735, 104th Cong. § 842 (1996) (proposing an amendment to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) [hereinafter AEDPA]).
19. Rice, 128 F.3d at 244-47; see discussion infra Part III.C.1-2.
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cuit's analysis and considers its arguments in light of other appellate and
United States Supreme Court decisions. Ultimately, this Part concludes
that the Fourth Circuit's reasoning was flawed. Part V examines the threat
this decision poses to First Amendment rights. In particular, Part V out-
lines the pressures this decision imposes on publishers, filmmakers, and
the media. Finally, Part VI concludes that courts should preserve the indi-
vidual's ability to deliberate and debate the values of speech, and that First
Amendment protection cannot be eliminated from publications that create
even a potential hazard.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." 20  It is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 21 Therefore, neither a state nor the federal gov-
ernment may limit an individual's freedom of speech, absent a compelling
reason. 
22
A. Balancing the Free Flow of Information
Numerous theories illustrate the values of free expression and the im-
portance of preserving speech. Most prominent, the "marketplace of ideas"
theory rests on the notion that promoting the free and open exchange of
ideas leads to the ascertainment of truth and the downfall of false
thoughts2 3 Tolerance and safety-valve theorists aim to increase social sta-
bility by furthering society's commitment to the endurance of reprehensible
views or by giving people an opportunity to express themselves in lieu of
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... Id; see Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
22. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991);
see Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How Imminent is Imminent?: The Inninent Danger Test Applied
to MurderManuals, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 49 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969). "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." Id; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get ac-
cepted in the competition of the market." Id
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committing harmful acts. 24 Some scholars stress that free speech promotes
public deliberation and a well-informed electorate, both -of which are es-
sential to democratic self-governance.25 Finally, libertarian theorists view
people as independent and rational decision makers with the right to control
their own thoughts and beliefs without government interference. 26
These theories guard against the dangerous proposition that while
government purports to be concerned with offensiveness or hostile audi-
ence reaction, it is in fact reacting to the persuasiveness of the speech that it
seeks to suppress.2 7 The First Amendment ultimately prevents the govern-
ment from stifling dissident views by alleging that such speech will cause
harm or violence.28
By the same notion, courts have often found that the values afforded
to the freedom of expression and its constitutional protection are not based
on naive beliefs that speech can do no harm. 29 Rather, like marketplace
theorists, courts are confident that the benefits gained from the free and
open exchange of ideas outweigh the costs endured by receiving harmful or
reproachable thoughts. 30  The Supreme Court itself has found that false
ideas do not exist in our society.3' "However pernicious an opinion may
seem, [the Court has] depend[ed] for its correction.., on the competition
of other ideas., 32 Thus, because all of society benefits from the open ex-
24. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 71 (1998).
25. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). "The protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id.
26. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individual's
interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for
open and informed discussion .. "); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control [people]'s
minds."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring)
("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free
to develop their faculties."), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per cu-
riam)).
27. Avital T. Zer-Ilan, Case Note, The First Amendment and Murder Manuals, 108 YALE
L.J. 2697, 2698-99 (1997) (citing David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Ex-
pression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 338 (1991)); see CASS R. SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 134 (1993) ("Government is rightly distrusted when it is regulating
speech that might harm its own interests; and when the speech at issue is political, its own inter-
ests are almost always at stake.").
28. Zer-Ilan, supra note 27, at 2698-99; see Strauss, supra note 27, at 337 (stating that "ty-
rants suppress speech because they fear it will be persuasive").
29. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5thCir. 1987).
30. Id.
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
32. Id. at 339-40.
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change of ideas, it is worth protecting some forms of harmful or reprehen-
sible speech, including so-called false ideas. 33 The possibility that a harm-
ful thought could lead to danger or violence is not immaterial in determin-
ing the state's power to penalize that thought for harm that ensues. 34
However, First Amendment protection cannot be eliminated simply be-
cause that thought creates a potential hazard.35
B. Unprotected Speech
Nevertheless, the First Amendment does not guarantee an absolute
right for anyone to express their views at any time, place, or in any manner
they choose. 36 For example, certain types of speech generally protected by
the First Amendment may be subject to government regulation.37 Freedom
of speech is not absolute.38 In fact, "[i]f the state interest is compelling
and the means of regulation [are] narrowly tailored to accomplish a proper
state purpose, regulation of expression is not forbidden by the [F]irst
[A]mendment. 39
The Supreme Court has recognized that some types of speech are ex-
cluded from or entitled only to narrow constitutional protection. 40 Freedom
33. Id. at 340-41.
34. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020.
35. Id.; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) ("Fear of serious in-
jury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech[.]").
36. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding a
ban on "fusion" ballots that allowed minor parties to list another party's nominee as their own);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding a Hawaiian statute that prohibited write-in
votes in general elections); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a municipality ban
on all picketing in front of a particular residence); United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic
Assns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding a federal statute that prohibited deposits of unstamped
materials in home mailboxes because mailboxes do not constitute public forums); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding a ban on all amplification devices operated in public
places that emitted loud and raucous noises).
38. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
39. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020. This is the general strict scrutiny standard adopted by the Su-
preme Court when examining content-based regulations on constitutionally protected speech. See
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (using "the most exacting scrutiny") (quoting Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987); Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
40. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
504 (1984). Traditionally, these areas received no constitutional protection. However, as a result
of RA. V., it can fairly be understood that even these areas may receive narrow protection under
certain circumstances. See RA.V., 505 U.S. at 383-86.
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of speech does not protect obscene materials, 41 child pornography,42 fight-
ing words,43 libel, 44 commercial speech,45 or words intended and likely to
incite imminent lawless action.46 These areas are recognized as having lit-
tle social value.47 Therefore, the social interests in order and morality
clearly outweigh any First Amendment protections these types of speech
may receive. 48 For the purposes of this Note, it is necessary to examine
only the standard for proscribing speech intended and likely to incite immi-
nent lawless action.49
C. Speech That Incites Imminent Lawless Action
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,0 the United States Supreme Court held that
abstract advocacy of lawlessness is protected speech under the First
Amendment."' The case involved a Ku Klux Klan leader convicted under
the Ohio criminal syndicalism statute for advocating violence as a means
for political change.52 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held
that the Constitution protects advocacy of the use of force or of the viola-
tion of laws except where that advocacy was "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and [wals likely to incite or produce such
action."5 3 The Court went on to note that "the mere abstract teaching ... of
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and vio-
41. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
42. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
43. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
44. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see RA.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83; Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at
504-05.
48. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see RA.V, 505 U.S. at 382-83; Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at
504-05.
49. The district court in Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), con-
sidered why the other forms of proscribed speech do not apply to the case in Rice. See Rice, 940
F. Supp. at 841.
50. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
51. Id.
52. Id. The leader stated "[w]e're not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that
there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." Id. at 446. Other comments noted by the
court included, "[t]his is what we are going to do to the n rs," "[slend the Jews back to Is-
rael," and "[w]e intend to do our part." Id. at 446 n. I (letters omitted).
53. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
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lence, [wals not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steel-
ing it to such action."4
In its opinion, the Court made a distinction between protected speech
that merely advocates violation of the law and unprotected speech that ac-
tually incites imminent lawless activity." It reasoned that a statute failing
to distinguish between the two would violate the freedoms guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 6 The Court found that the words
spoken by the Klansman amounted to mere advocacy, and that the statute
punishing such speech was unconstitutional.5 7
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have revisited the Brandenburg
standard. In Hess v. Indiana,58 the Court held that provocative remarks ut-
tered by a demonstrator could not be punished solely on the basis that these
remarks had a tendency to incite violence.5 9 It found that there was no evi-
dence that "[the] words [used] were intended to produce, and likely to pro-
duce, imminent disorder....'a
The Hess Court determined that the crucial element in lowering the
First Amendment shield was the imminence of the threatened evil. 6' The
Court was faced with the question of whether an anti-war demonstrator
could be punished under Indiana's disorderly conduct statute for loudly
shouting, "[w]e'll take the f _ street later, ,62 as police attempted to
move the crowd of demonstrators off the street so vehicles could pass.63
The Court reasoned that because Hess's statement was not specifically di-
rected to any group of people, his words did not advocate any immediate
action 64 Moreover, because there was no evidence from the language that
his words were intended and likely to produce imminent disorder, these
words could not be punished on the ground that they had a "tendency to
lead to violence." 65
Eleven years later, in National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,66 the Court again demon-
54. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
55. Id. at 447-48.
56. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
57. Id. at 448-49.
58. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 109 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 107 (letters omitted).
63. Id. at 106-07.
64. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
65. Id.
66. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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strated that the Brandenburg test would be rigorously applied.67 This case
involved efforts by African-American citizens in a Mississippi county to
boycott white merchants until certain demands for racial equality were sat-
isfied. 68 Speaking in favor of the boycott, defendant Charles Evers69 stated
that African-Americans who violated the boycott would be "discipline[d]"
by their own people. 70
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court verdict against Evers and
others for the lost earnings of the white merchants .7' The Court concluded
that his speech did not constitute imminent incitement, and was therefore
protected by the First Amendment. 72 Although he used "strong language,"
the Court reasoned that "[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audi-
ence with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a
common cause." 73 Consequently, Evers's language did not qualify as in-
citement of imminent violence. 74 In reaching its conclusion, the Court also
considered the fact that the boycotts did not occur immediately after
Evers's speech, but rather transpired weeks or months later.75  The Court
thus implied that when speech is followed by immediate violent or other-
wise illegal acts, the requisite intent and likeliness to incite are more likely
to be found, than when no such acts immediately follow.
76
It is important to recognize that Brandenburg and its progeny 77 devel-
oped a two-part standard for examining the advocacy of unlawful conduct.
First, a court must consider whether the speech was directed to incite or
produce imminent lawless action7' as opposed to mere abstract advocacy,
not directed at producing any type of immediate activity. Second, a court
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Evers was one of the NAACP leaders at the time. See id. at 898.
70. Id. at 903, 927.
71. Id. at 934.




76. Id.; see FARBER, supra note 24, at 70.
77. The Warren Court actually foreshadowed its ruling in Brandenburg in two prior cases.
See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 117 (1966) (holding that defendant could not be penalized for
his statements because they did not constitute a call for unlawful draft resistance, but were merely
general, abstract declarations of opposition to war); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969) (holding that the defendant speaker did not intend to make a "true threat" against the
President, but rather aimed at stating his political opposition to the President's ideals in a "Very
crude, offensive" way). The Hess and Claiborne cases are important, however, because they
demonstrate how the post-Warren era Supreme Court followed the Brandenburg standard.
78. FARBER, supra note 24, at 69.
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must consider likelihood by determining whether the lawless activity is
likely to occur as an immediate result of the speech. 79 Therefore, the test as
a whole forbids protection of any speech that is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action.
The Brandenburg test has most often been applied to cases involving
political speech.80 Although such speech is considered to be at "the core of
the First Amendment,"'" the Supreme Court has generally not differentiated
between categories of protected speech for the purposes of determining
constitutional protection.8 2 The test, therefore, is not inherently limited to
political speech cases.83
79. id.
80. See, e.g., Claibome, 458 U.S. at 926-28; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (indicat-
ing that expression on public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values).
81. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 926-27.
82. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987). Such an en-
deavor by the Court "would not only be hopelessly complicated but would raise substantial con-
cern that the worthiness of speech might be judged by majoritarian notions of political and social
propriety and morality." Id.
83. See, e.g., Herceg, 14 F.2d at 1017 (reversing a jury award of damages in a wrongful
death action against a magazine publisher for adolescent's death allegedly caused by article that
described practice of autoerotic asphyxia); Zamora v. Colombia Broad. Sys., Inc., 480 F. Supp.
199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (dismissing suit brought by a fifteen year-old boy against television net-
works for violent programming that allegedly caused him to commit criminal acts); McCollum v.
CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing suit against Ozzy Ozbourne record that
included song "Suicide Solution" which allegedly exhorted suicide); Bill v. Superior Court, 187
Cal. Rptr. 625 (Ct. App. 1982) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim that a producer of a gang violence
film was liable for the shooting of plaintiffs daughter by a third party shortly after boy saw the
film); Olivia N. v. NBC, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding no cause of action
when girl raped by teenaged girls imitating similar incident depicted on television drama); Walt
Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981) (dismissing plaintiffs claim that the
broadcast of a television program caused plaintiffs son to be injured when the son imitated an
experiment performed on the television program); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (dismissing wrongful death action by father of boy slain by person
who had just seen the film The Warriors, which depicted scenes of gang violence, despite the fact
that the perpetrator uttered a line from the film while committing the homicide); DeFilippo v.
National Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1040 (R.I. 1982) (dismissing wrongful death suit against
NBC brought by parents of a deceased minor after their son hung himself while imitating a
hanging stunt he observed on the Johnny Carson Show); Way v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d
230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (dismissing plaintiffs claims against a publisher of a firearm adver-
tisement in a magazine advertisement that allegedly caused a fatal firearm injury to plaintiffs
son).
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III. RICE V PALADIN ENTERS., INC.
A. Background
As described above, James Edward Perry murdered Mildred Horn,
her eight-year-old quadriplegic son, Trevor, and Trevor's nurse, Janice
Saunders on the night of March 3, 1993. 84 A copy of Hit Man was found in
Perry's apartment.85 In the civil wrongful death action against Hit Man
publisher Paladin Enterprises, the relatives and representatives of the three
victims alleged that Paladin aided and abetted Perry in committing the
murders through its publication of Hit Man's killing instructions.1
6
Perry's actions and Hit Man's text are strikingly similar. Hit Man in-
structs readers that the victim's personal residence is the "initial choice"
location for a murder and an ideal place to make a hit, depending on its
layout and position. Perry murdered his victims at the Horn's residence. 8
The book further instructs its readers to use a rental car to reach the vic-
tim's location, and to "steal an out-of-state tag"' 9 to "replace the rental
tag' 90 on the car, explaining that "[sltolen tags only show up on the police
computer of the state in which they are stolen."9  Similarly, Perry stole
out-of-state tags and affixed them to a rental car before driving it to the
Horn's residence on the night of the murders.
92
With respect to weapons, Hit Man instructs a "beginner" to use an
AR-7 rifle to kill their victims. 93 The book informs readers where to find
the gun's serial numbers and instructs them to completely drill out these
numbers prior to using the weapon so that it cannot be traced.94 Perry used
an AR-7 rifle and drilled out its serial numbers exactly as the book in-
structed. 95 Finally, Hit Man instructs in explicit detail how to construct a
84. Rice, 128 F.3d at 239.
85. Id. A second book was found in Perry's apartment, also published by Paladin entitled
How To Make A Disposable Silencer, VOL. II. Id. at 241. However, both the district court and
court of appeals focused on Hit Man. Id. at 233. This Note will focus only on Hit Man and its
text.
86. Id. at 241.
87. FERAL, supra note 7, at 81-82.
88. Perry v. State, 686 A.2d 274, 277 (Md. 1996).
89. FERAL, supra note 7, at 98.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Perry, 686 A.2d at 276.
93. FERAL, supra note 7, at 21.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Perry, 686 A.2d at 280.
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homemade, "whisper-quiet" silencer from material available in any hard-
ware store.96 Again, Perry constructed a similar silencer and used it to
commit the murders.97 In addition, Hit Man contains numerous instructions
on killing, concealing the murder, making bombs, and disposing of bod-
ies.98
On summary judgment, the parties agreed that the sole issue for the
court to decide was whether the First Amendment was a complete defense,
96. FERAL, supra note 7, at 39-51.
97. Rice, 128 F.3d at 240; see id at 239-41 (providing a full comparison of the books in-
structions and Perry's actions).
98. The similarities between Perry's acts and Hit Man's text are strikingly similar. The fo-
cus of this Note, however, is on the book's text and the notion that such text should be protected
under the First Amendment. It is therefore important to consider a sample of the book's passages
to understand the Fourth Circuit's reasoning:
It is my opinion that the professional hit man fills a need in society and is, at times,
the only alternative for "personal" justice. Moreover, if my advice and the proven
methods in this book are followed, certainly no one will ever know ....
[And when] [y]ou've read all the suggested material, you [will have] honed
your mind, body and reflexes into a precision piece of professional machinery.
You [will have] assembled the necessary tools and learned to use them efficiently.
Your knowledge of dealing death [will have] increased to the point where you have
a choice of methods. Finally, you [will be] confident and competent enough to ac-
cept employment ....
The kill is the easiest part of the job. People kill one another every day. It
takes no great effort to pull a trigger or plunge a knife. It is being able to do so in a
manner that will not link yourself or your employer to the crime that makes you a
professional ....
[If you decide to kill your victim with a knife,] [t]he knife.., should have a
six-inch blade with a serrated edge for making efficient, quiet kills... . The knife
should have a double-edged blade. This double-edge, combined with the serrated
section and six-inch length, will insure a deep, ragged tear, and the wound will be
difficult, if not impossible, to close without prompt medical attention... . Make
your thrusts to a vital organ and twist the knife before you withdraw it .... [S]tab
deeply into the side of the victim's neck and push the knife forward in a forceful
movement...
[If you plan to kill your victim with a gun,]... [use] a small caliber weapon
like the 22, it is best to shoot from a distance of three to six feet. You will not want
to be at point-blank range to avoid having the victim's blood splatter you or your
clothing. At least three shots should be fired to ensure quick and sure death.
[In order to dispose of a corpse,] you can simply cut off the head after burying
the body. Take the head to some deserted location, place a stick of dynamite in the
mouth, and blow the telltale dentition to smithereens....! If you choose to sink the
corpse, you must first make several deep stabs into the body's lungs (from just un-
der the rib cage) and belly. This is necessary because gases released during de-
composition will bloat these organs, causing the body to rise to the surface of the
water.
[After you killed your victim,] you felt absolutely nothing. And you are
shocked by the nothingness ... Your experience in facing death head-on has taught
you about life. You have the power and ability to stand alone. You no longer need
a reason to kill.
Rice, 128 F.3d at 236-39. These passages, among others, were selected by the Fourth Circuit as
representative of the type of content contained within Hit Man's 130 pages of text. See id.
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as a matter of law, to the civil action set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint.99
The district court granted summary judgment to the publisher""° On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.'0 '
B. Overview of the District Court Opinion
The district court determined that Hit Man was protected by the First
Amendment unless it failed the Brandenburg standard.'02 The court found
Brandenburg applicable to this case for two reasons.103  First, similar to
Brandenburg, this case involved speech advocating lawless activity-spe-
cifically, how to commit a murder.' °4 Second, although the plaintiffs ar-
gued that Brandenburg could not apply because it had been applied most
often to cases involving political speech, 05 the court felt the standard was
"not inherently limited to political speech cases."' 06  The court therefore
proceeded to consider Hit Man in light of the Brandenburg test.'07
Paladin conceded for purposes of summary judgment that it intended
for the book to be purchased and actually used by criminals. According to
the court, however, the publisher did not demonstrate the requisite intent
required under the first prong of the Brandenburg test.'0 8 The court deter-
mined that in order to have the requisite intent, Paladin must have aimed
for Perry to go out and commit the triple murder immediately. 1t 9 Further,
although the court found that the book was morally repugnant, it felt that
99. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
100. Id. at 242.
101. Id. at 243.
102. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844. That is, it was to remain protected unless the court found
that the publisher intended to incite imminent lawless action and that the book's text was likely to
produce such action.
103. Id. at 845-47.
104. Id. at 845.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 846. The court cited numerous cases in support of this contention. See supra
note 83. The majority of cases cited by the court were what are termed "copycat" cases in which
the media defendants were sued because information they had disseminated somehow caused or
enabled someone to injure themselves or another. These cases are somewhat different from the
present case because most were not considered to have a "how-to" format like the subject book.
But see Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing jury's award
of damages in a wrongful death action against a magazine publisher for adolescent's death alleg-
edly caused by how-to article describing the practice of autoerotic asphyxia). The court deter-
mined these cases to be applicable, however, and considered Brandenburg a proper standard.
107. Id. at 846-50.
108. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847; see discussion supra Part II.C.
109. Id. at 847. Perry, however, committed the murders one year after receiving Hit Man.
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the book's message did not constitute incitement or "a call to action.""
The court reasoned that Hit Man did not promote committing immediate
unlawful activity, but rather focused on providing information on how to
become an effective hit man."' For the court, this was abstract advocacy,
not direct incitement.1 12 It thus concluded that Hit Man's text constituted
mere abstract teaching, and that it did not purport to order any concrete ac-
tion at any specific time.'
Under Brandenburg's second prong, the district court found that no
imminent lawless action was likely to occur as a result of reading Hit Man.
Crucial to the court's decision were Hit Man's two separate warnings.'
1 4
First, the back cover states that the book's contents are "[f]or informational
purposes only!""'  Next, a cautionary statement immediately preceding the
table of contents explains that the actions described in the book are illegal,
that they hail severe penalties, and that the publisher assumes no responsi-
bility for the misuse of the information.'
6
The court also noted the fact that out of 13,000 copies sold in over ten
years of publication, only one person actually used the information."
17
Moreover, the court added that the context of the information in Hit Man
was equally significant." 8 It stated that the book took time to read and
"[a]t worst[,] . .. amount[ed] to nothing more than advocacy of illegal ac-
tion at some indefinite future time."" 9 Under these circumstances, the
court found it difficult to conclude that Hit Man constituted incitement to
imminent lawless activity or that it was likely to incite such activity. 20
The district court concluded that while the book was proven to con-
tain information that was dangerous when placed in the wrong hands, First
110. Id. (quoting Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys. 480 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 322 (1957)).
111. Id at 847.
112. Id. at 848.
113. Id.
114. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848.
115. FERAL, supra note 7, at back cover (emphasis added).
116. FERAL, supra note 7, at vi.
IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO manufacture a silencer without an appropriate li-
cense from the federal government. There are state and local laws prohibiting the
possession of weapons and their accessories in many areas. Severe penalties are
prescribed for violations of these laws. Neither the author nor the publisher as-
sumes responsibility for the use or misuse of information contained in this book.
For informational purposes only!
Id. (emphasis in original).




388 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
Amendment protection was not eliminated simply because the publication
created a potential hazard.' 2' It stated that a free and democratic society
should not "restrict artistic creativity in order to avoid the dissemination of
ideas... [that] may adversely affect emotionally troubled individuals.'
' 22
The district court, therefore, granted summary judgment on behalf of Pala-
din and dismissed the case.123
C. The Fourth Circuit Opinion
The Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's ruling and created the possibility that Paladin may be held civilly
liable. The appellate court found Paladin's stipulations that it intended Hit
Man to be used by criminals and would-be criminals to commit murder-for-
hire very influential. 124 The court then examined the book itself and found
that Hit Man exhibited much more than mere abstract advocacy, and in-
stead rose to the level of "specific intent" to aid and abet in the murders in-
volved. 125
The court thus concluded that Brandenburg did not apply to the Rice
case. It reasoned that the standard was limited to protecting abstract advo-
cacy of lawlessness and the open criticism of government and its institu-
tions. 126 Thus, Brandenburg could not apply to "the teaching of the techni-
cal methods of criminal activity-in this case, the technical methods of
murder."127 It further found Hit Man to have little resemblance to the ab-
stract criticisms jealously protected by Brandenburg.21 Instead, the Rice
court felt the book's instructions failed to compare with historically pro-
tected rhetorical threats of politically or socially motivated violence. 29 The
court, therefore, based its overall conclusion to remand in four different ar-
eas.
121. Id. (citing Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020).
122. Id. (citing Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Mass.
1989) (citing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988))).
123. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 849.
124. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
125. Id. at 255-56.
126. Id. at 250.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 262.
129. Id.
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1. The Criminal Cases
First, the court analogized the few existing criminal cases that failed
to protect certain forms of speech against charges of criminal aiding and
abetting.130 In United States v. Barnett,131 the Ninth Circuit held that the
First Amendment did not provide publishers with a defense, as a matter of
law, to charges of aiding and abetting a crime by publication and distribu-
tion of instructions detailing the production of illegal drugs.
3 2
The Rice court found Barnett to firmly hold that instructions aiding
and abetting others in the commission of a criminal offense lay unprotected
by the First Amendment. It further concluded that the Ninth Circuit's po-
sition was uniformly accepted, applied to the aiding and abetting of numer-
ous other crimes, and thus could apply here.
33
2. Failed Federal Legislation and Department of Justice Report
Second, the court relied on previously failed federal legislation 34 and
a Department of Justice Report 35 to guide its ruling. 36 In the wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Senator Dianne Feinstein backed a pro-
posal criminalizing the teaching and dissemination of the manufacture of
explosive materials if the distributor intended, knew, or reasonably should
have known that such information would likely be used in furtherance of
certain specified criminal offenses. 37  Although Feinstein called it a
"common-sense" amendment, critics in the House of Representatives re-
130. Rice, 128 F.3d at 244-46.
131. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 843. "To the extent.., that Barnett appears to contend that he is immune from
search or prosecution because he uses the printed word in encouraging and counseling others in
the commission of a crime, we hold expressly that the first amendment does not provide a defense
as a matter of law to such conduct." Id. (emphasis in original).
133. Rice, 128 F.3d at 245 (citing United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kelley, 769
F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Buttorf 572 F.2d 619, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1978)).
134. Prohibition on Dissemination of Information Relating to Explosive Materials for a
Criminal Purpose, S. 735, 104th Cong. § 842 (1996) (proposing an amendment to AEDPA, Pub.
L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
135. Department of Justice, Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information, the Ex-
tent to Which its Dissemination is Controlled by Federal Law, and the Extent to Which Such Dis-
semination May Be Subject to Regulation Consistent With the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution (April 1997) [hereinafter DOJ Report].
136. Rice, 128 F.3d at 246 n.3.
137. Prohibition on Dissemination of Information Relating to Explosive Materials for a
Criminal Purpose, S. 735, 104th Cong. § 842 (1996) (proposing an amendment to AEDPA, Pub.
L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
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moved the provision from anti-terrorism legislation on free speech
grounds.
38
The court also relied on a Department of Justice Report resulting from
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.139 In the report, Con-
gress required the Attorney General to conduct a study concerning the ex-
tent to which there is public access to certain harmful or dangerous instruc-
tional materials.' 4 The Attorney General's report, in turn, found that "[tihe
First Amendment would impose substantial constraints on any attempt to
proscribe indiscriminately the dissemination of bombmaking informa-
tion.' 141 While recognizing substantial governmental constraints in pro-
scribing published materials, the Rice court found the report significant in
allowing the government to punish any speech that was deemed an "inte-
gral part of [a] [criminal] transaction." 42
3. Intent
Third, the appellate court considered two qualifications where, in the
civil context, the First Amendment requires a heightened analysis so that
"preeminent values underlying that constitutional provision not be imper-
iled."' 143 The first of these was intent. 44 The Rice court reasoned that the
138. David G. Savage, Did Hired Killer Go by the Book?, L.A. TIMEs, May 7, 1997, at A17.
139. AEDPA, supra note 18, at 1297.
140. Rice, 128 F.3d at 246 n.3. The study focused on materials instructing "how to make
bombs, destructive devices, or weapons of mass destruction," the application of then existing fed-
eral laws to such materials, and the extent to which the First Amendment protects such materials
and their private and commercial distribution. Id.
141. Id. (quoting DOJ Report, see supra note 135, at 2.) The report stated:
The government generally may not, except in rare circumstances, punish persons
either for advocating lawless action or for disseminating truthful information-in-
cluding information that would be dangerous if used-that such persons have ob-
tained lawfully. However, the constitutional analysis is quite different where the
government punishes speech that is an integral part of a transaction involving con-
duct the government otherwise is empowered to prohibit; such "speech acts"-for
instance, many cases of inchoate crimes such as aiding and abetting and conspir-
acy-may be proscribed without much, if any, concern about the First Amendment,
because it is merely incidental that such "conduct" takes the form of speech.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
142. Id.
143. Rice, 128 F.3d at 247.
144. Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan 376, U.S. 254 (1964)); United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593, 605 (1995) (rejecting the defendant's First Amendment construction in part be-
cause the statute imposed restrictions only on those who disclosed wiretap information in order to
obstruct, impede, or prevent a wiretap interception); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981)
(stating "[the defendant's] disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of ob-
structing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not
protected by the Constitution."); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir.
1972) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to federal statute after construing statute to require
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First Amendment, in the civil liability context, requires that an actor pos-
sess specific intent to commit a crime. 45 Liability on the basis of mere
foreseeability or knowledge that information could be misused for an im-
permissible purpose is insufficient.'4 Such a limitation addresses the le-
gitimate concern of publishers and other mass media who fear exposure to
suit under less restrictive intent standards. 47 At the same time, the appel-
late court determined that this limitation does not relieve those who inten-
tionally assist and encourage crime. 14
In a consolidated statement of facts, Paladin stipulated that it engaged
in a marketing strategy to attract and assist criminals and would-be crimi-
nals.149 It further stated that in publishing and distributing Hit Man, it in-
tended that their publications "would be used by criminals... and would-
be criminals to plan and execute the crime of murder for hire."' 5° Finally,
for the sole purpose of summary judgment, Paladin conceded that by pub-
lishing, distributing and selling Hit Man to Perry, it assisted him in the sub-
sequent perpetration of the murders.'
5'
In addition to these stipulations, the Rice court considered four other
grounds upon which a reasonable jury could find intent. 52 First, the court
pointed out that the declared purpose of Hit Man is to serve as a murder
manual. 5 3 Second, the court found that the book's extensive promotion of
murder was "highly probative of the publisher's intent."' 4 Third, the court
proclaimed that examining the "publisher's marketing strategy would more
than support a finding of the requisite intent."'" Finally, the court found a
jury could reasonably conclude that Paladin specifically intended to assist
Perry and similar murderers by holding that Hit Man's only genuine use
"intent or knowledge that... information disseminated would be used in the furtherance of a civil
disorder."). The second qualification recognized by the Rice court was abstract advocacy. Rice,
128 F.3d at 248; see discussion infra Part III.C.4.




148. Id. at 248.
149. Id. at 241.
150. Id.
151. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241. Anxious to avoid probing discovery motions and then a trial,
Paladin's legal team agreed to accept these stipulations, solely for purposes of summary judg-
ment, in exchange for a quick ruling on whether the First Amendment shielded the publisher from
liability. See Savage, supra note 138, at A17. Had these stipulations not existed, Paladin argua-
bly could have had a much stronger case.
152. Rice, 128 F.3d at 253-55.
153. Id. at 253.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 254.
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was the unlawful facilitation of such murders. 156 Thus, accepting Paladin's
stipulations and itself analyzing the book's text, the Rice court concluded
that the publisher possessed the specific intent to assist in the murders.
4. Abstract Advocacy
Finally, under the second qualification, the court closely examined
Hit Man's language and concluded that the book could not profess abstract
advocacy. The court stated that the First Amendment circumscribes the
power of the state to create and enforce a cause of action that permits the
imposition of civil liability, for speech that constitutes pure abstract advo-
cacy. 1 7 Thus, if certain speech is not directed at inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action, a publisher cannot be liable.5 8 The court admitted
that the instances where such advocacy would actually give rise to civil li-
ability under state statutes are rare, but do exist." 9
The court contended that a jury could reasonably find that Paladin
aided and abetted in the murders through the "quintessential speech act of
providing step-by-step instructions for murder.., so comprehensive and
detailed... as if the instructor were literally present with the would-be
murderer... ." 60 The appellate court further argued that such speech
bares no resemblance to the "theoretical advocacy,' 16 1 the advocacy of
"principles divorced from action,"' 62 or "the mere abstract teaching [of] the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and vio-
lence,, 163 that had always been protected by the Supreme Court.164 The
court was satisfied that a reasonable jury could find the instructions had
virtually no instructional value. 65  Furthermore, it held that such a jury
could find that the book's only "communicative value [wa]s the indisputa-
bly illegitimate one of training people how to murder and to engage in the
business of murder for hire."' 1
156. Id. at 255.
157. Id. at 249.
158. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
159. Id. But see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). These cases predicated crimi-
nal prosecution upon subversive advocacy.
160. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
161. Id. (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 235 (1961)).
162. Id. (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320 (1957)).
163. Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969)).
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
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The appellate court then embarked on a seven page abstract advocacy
discussion criticizing Hit Man's language.167 While the court considered
certain notions of the Brandenburg standard, such as intent and abstract
advocacy, the court of appeals ignored the test and found that the First
Amendment does not shield Paladin from civil liability.
6
IV. WHERE THE FOURTH CIRCUIT FAILED
A. The Proper Standard
The First Amendment bars the imposition of civil liability on Paladin
unless Hit Man falls within one of the well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech that remain unprotected. 169 A court, therefore, must first
recognize where, in the spectrum of First Amendment protections, Hit Man
would best be categorized. If the book's text does not fit within one of the
six forms of speech usually unprotected,' 70 the book receives full First
Amendment protection. 171 If a court determines, however, that the actions
of the publisher and the book's text are similar to one of the unprotected
areas, the court must examine these actions and the text under the appropri-
ate test.
72
167. Id. at 255-63.
168. The Fourth Circuit also based its opinion on Maryland's civil cause of action for aiding
and abetting. Id at 250. The district court erred in its initial ruling by failing to recognize a
Maryland civil cause of action for aiding and abetting. Id. Once brought to the court's attention,
however, the lower court simply amended its opinion by concluding alternatively that Hit Man
was entitled to the protections ofBrandenburg. Id. Recognizing Maryland's civil cause of action
for aiding and abetting, the appellate court determined that Maryland courts would conclude that
an aiding and abetting cause of action did lie in the circumstances of this case. Id. at 251. The
court further concluded that the plaintiffs had, by way of stipulation and otherwise, established a
genuine issue of material fact as to each element of that cause of action. Id. at 251-52. Specifi-
cally, that plaintiffs had more than met their burden of establishing a genuine issue of fact as to
Paladin's intent, even assuming heightened standards set by the First Amendment. Id. at 252.
The appellate court argued the lower court was never required to consider any element of intent
required under Maryland's aiding and abetting law, or whether the First Amendment held a
heightened requirement, because the district court failed to fully recognize the Maryland claim.
Id. at 253.
169. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1941); see R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-05 (1984).
170. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83; Bose Corp., 466 U.S.
at 503-05; see also supra Part I.B.
171. Full First Amendment protection will be afforded unless a state or federal statute pro-
vides for a narrowly tailored regulation and a compelling government interest. See Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
172. See National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claibome Hardware Co.,
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As noted by the district court, the only test appropriate for examining
Hit Man is the Brandenburg standard-determining whether the book
qualifies as speech intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action. '
The book not only advocates lawless activity, but can also be seen as a po-
litical manifesto advocating the need of the "hit man" in society and pro-
viding the tools to learn this skill.' 74 Therefore, in its consideration of
whether Paladin was protected under the First Amendment, the Rice court
was required to examine whether by publishing Hit Man, Paladin intended
to incite imminent lawless action, and whether that imminent lawless action
was likely to occur from the book's text.
This task was to be done by the court as a matter of law.1 75 The Su-
preme Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 176
noted that the jury's role in considering the limits of any unprotected cate-
gory or "unprotected character of particular communications" has little sig-
nificance.'7 Rather, the Court has relied on its own "judicial evaluation of
special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional significance.'
7 8
In such cases, the Court has conducted independent review of the record,
finding that juries have neither narrowed any unprotected category, nor
eliminated the danger of inhibiting the expression of protected ideas.'7
Most important, the Court has conducted such independent review in this
context-deciding for itself whether advocacy is directed and likely to in-
cite or produce imminent lawless action.' ° The Rice court, however, failed
to do this.
458 U.S. 886, 916 n.50 (1982) (stating that "[fln cases where [the First Amendment] line must be
drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances
under which they were made[,l to see... whether they are of a character which the principles of
the First.Amendment... protect") (citations omitted); Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 505. The court
regularly conducted "independent review of the record both to be sure that the speech... actually
falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category
within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhib-
ited." Id.
173. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844. The book advocates lawless activity. It is not obscenity,
commercial speech, child pornography, libel, or fighting words. Id.
174. FERAL, supra note 7, at ix. "It is my opinion that the professional hit man fills a need
in society... Id.
175. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 505 (explaining that the limits of the individual unprotected
areas "as well as the unprotected character of particular communications, have been determined
by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional signifi-
cance.").
176. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
177. Id. at 505.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 915-16 n.50 (quoting the proposition that the Court re-
view for itself the statements in issue).
180. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973).
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B. The Critique
1. The Criminal Cases
As mentioned, the Rice court first relied on the few existing criminal
cases that denied First Amendment protection to those who were prose-
cuted for aiding and abetting.' As these cases illustrate, the federal cir-
cuits have refused to apply Brandenburg in the criminal context and have
held publishers to a less speech-protective standard--considering whether
publishers intended to assist in the commission of a crime.1 2 Although it is
beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to recognize that Branden-
burg should apply to those criminal cases as well.1 3 The publishers who
were prosecuted were not involved in integrated criminal transactions and
it was never clearly shown that the speech was either intended or likely to
incite imminent lawlessness.
Regardless, the major distinction between those cases and Rice is that
Rice is a civil suit. ' Although some publishers have been held criminally
liable for publishing speech that aims to aid and abet in a crime, courts
have been reluctant to transfer this liability to a civil context."8 5 The ap-
pellate court, however, concluded that these criminal cases apply to Rice. 1
86
In so doing, it considered other areas where criminal standards carried over
into the civil arena.8 7 This was a detrimental error, however, because civil
181. Rice, 128 F.3d at 244-46.
182. See id.
183. Brandenburg itself was decided pursuant to Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). It is therefore questionable why the federal circuits
have avoided applying the standard in the criminal context, especially in these types of cases
where the speech was not directly involved in any crime and was not intended to or likely to
cause imminent lawlessness. By so doing, they have unavoidably created confusion as to where
Brandenburg applies. In its strictest form, Brandenburg would inherently include these cases.
184. Rice, 128 F.3d at 233. There has been no criminal suit filed against Paladin. If there
had been, there is a possibility that in a criminal context, Paladin could be found guilty because
the standard seems much lower. See id. at 244-46; see also discussion supra Part III.C. 1.
185. Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 25.
186. Rice, 128 F.3d at 246-47.
187. Id. (comparing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying similar standards to
criminal libel prosecutions and private defamation actions) with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)); see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (finding that the
First Amendment did not bar liability for newspaper's publication of confidential source's name
in a civil case); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (refusing to
bar First Amendment liability from common law tort); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (rejecting First Amendment defense to copyright infringement ac-
tion).
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and criminal cases possess tremendous distinctions.' 88 Indeed, the Rice
court itself recognized that in the civil context, the First Amendment im-
poses heightened requirements that would otherwise not exist in criminal
law. 189
2. Misapplication of Failed Federal Legislation and Department of Justice
Report
Further, urged by the Attorney General and Justice Department,190 the
court misapplied the Department's report by viewing Paladin not as an ab-
stract advocate of lawless activity, but as an intricate part of some criminal
scheme. As stated in the report, an individual lacks First Amendment pro-
tection where that individual uses the spoken or written word to conduct a
crime.' 9 In that situation, it is justified to punish speech not when it is di-
rected and likely to incite imminent lawless activity, but rather simply
when the government can show that that certain speech or text was inte-
grated into a criminal act. However, according to the report, this analysis
does not apply to a publisher who, especially on a market scale, advocates
lawless action or disseminates truthful information, even if that information
would be dangerous if used.192 Such regulations would indiscriminately
impose massive burdens on most law-abiding publishers. 93
The court, therefore, rested on its own misapplication of the Justice
Department's report and the failed efforts of Senator Feinstein not only to
188. The Constitution, statutes, and the common law all draw fundamental distinctions be-
tween criminal proceedings, that emphasize the adjudication of guilt or innocence with strict ad-
versarial protections for the accused, and civil proceedings, that emphasize the rights and respon-
sibilities of private parties. See Mary M. Cheh, Note, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-
Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991).
189. Rice, 128 F.3d at 247; see discussion supra Part III.C.3-4; see also discussion infra Part
IV.B.3-4.
190. Rice, 128 F.3d at 246 n.3. 'The decision we reach today, which, as noted, was urged
upon us by Attorney General Reno and the Department of Justice, follows from the principle con-
clusion reached by the Attorney General and the Department..." Id. Although the Justice De-
partment report provided a proper analysis, it opined concern with the lower court's decision.
The report stated, "[W]e believe that the district court in Rice v. Paladin erred insofar as it con-
cluded that Brandenburg bars liability for dissemination of [instructions on murder] regardless of
the publisher's intent . I... d. at 253 (citing DOJ Report, supra note 135, at 43, 44-45 n.71).
191. In other words, where someone writes a letter with instructions on how to make a bomb
and, intending to help, then sends it to another who plans to use the instructions, there is no First
Amendment protection.
192. Rice, 128 F.3d at 247.
193. Id. For example, publishers would be concerned with the inability to freely publish in-
formation, as well as with the costs of constant law suits and raised 'insurance rates because of
such suits. Indeed, a small publisher would be put out of business with a suit like that in Rice.
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justify its decision, but also to hold applicable the criminal cases discussed
earlier. It misinterpreted the Department's report and Senator Feinstein's
proposal because those documents referred strictly to criminal prosecution.
They do not expressly, or even implicitly, intend to consider civil liability,
nor can they apply in such a context. Although criminal law seemingly
poses little barrier to the prosecution of different speech acts,'9 the Rice
court noted that the First Amendment creates a heightened standard of
analysis in the civil context.'95 This higher standard makes Senator Fein-
stein's failed amendment, the Justice Department report, and the criminal
cases discussed earlier, inherently inapplicable to a civil case.
3. Intent
Although civil liability under the First Amendment does require a
heightened intent standard, the Rice court erroneously ignored this test.
The test for intent in the context of First Amendment civil liability is not
whether Paladin intended to aid and abet murderers or would-be murderers
in the commission of their crimes, but whether the publisher, through its
release of Hit Man, intended to incite imminent lawless activity. In terms
of these particular facts, the requisite intent required that Paladin intended
for Perry to go out and commit these murders immediately after reading Hit
Man.
With this in mind, the four examples of intent the Rice court consid-
ered appropriate to bring before a jury cannot apply. '9 If these examples
indicate anything, they connote the type of speech protected by Branden-
burg. They evidence the mere abstract teaching of the moral necessity for
a resort to force or violence.197 As noted by the district court, nowhere in
the text of Hit Man does it say "go out and commit murder now!"' 9'
Rather, "the book seems to say, in so many words, 'if you want to be a hit
man this is what you need to do.""" Without directive, or commanding
language, these four examples cannot indicate intent. They support only
the notion that the book enlists the essence of speech protected by Bran-
denburg.
194. Id. at 245.
195. Id. at 247-49.
196. The fact that Hit Man is an instruction book on murder, that it extensively promoted
murder, the consideration of Paladin's marketing strategy, or considerations of Hit Man's legiti-
mate use cannot suggest Paladin's intent to incite imminent lawless activity. See discussion su-
pra Part III.C.3.
197. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
198. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
199. Id.
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In addition, the court entirely dismissed Paladin's warnings as "titil-
lating" efforts aimed at enticing readers.2 00 The main warning, however, is
explicit.201  It explains that certain laws prohibit the conduct discussed
within the book and that taking part in such conduct hails severe penal-
ties. 2 2 This is a clear indication that Paladin did not really intend to incite
imminent murderous acts.203 Again, absent any language directing readers
to perform imminent lawless activity, and considering the extensive initial
warning, a jury could not conclude that Paladin intended to incite imminent
lawless activity.2° Moreover, any decision to remand to the jury was mis-
placed as the Supreme Court has consistently provided an independent re-
view when considering the various unprotected areas of speech.
20 5
Additionally, although Paladin's stipulations were admittedly dam-
aging, they were not enough for the court to establish the requisite intent
under Brandenburg. The Brandenburg standard considers imminence. 2°6
Even if Paladin conceded to some intention of inciting murder, it never
conceded an intention to incite imminent murder. Although the difference
seems unimportant, Brandenburg demands the imminence element. 20 7 As
the Supreme Court analyzed in Hess, construing the stipulation in the least
favorable terms to Paladin, its intention was at worst "advocacy of illegal
200. Rice, 128 F.3d at 263 n.10.
201. See FERAL, supra note 7, at vi.
202. See id.
203. However:
A clever speaker might incite a crowd to violence without ever explicitly directing
them to break the law; indeed, he might ironically direct them not to do so in terms
leaving little doubt about his real intent. .. . [The] classic example is Mark An-
thony's funeral oration, purportedly aiming to "bury Caesar not to praise him," but
actually making a plea for revenge ... "
FARBER, supra note 24, at 70. Nevertheless, in the context of a book involving national scale
publishers, the court should give deference to the actual warning. It would otherwise involve it-
self into a greater debate on how to decipher the meaning of words and sentence structure to ana-
lyze subjective intent.
204. Even if it were appropriate for a jury to so conclude, this would not immediately estab-
lish Paladin's liability, the jury would still have to consider whether this activity was likely to
occur.
205. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 505; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
206. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
207. It is arguable how soon a result has to occur to be considered imminent, i.e., one hour,
one day, one month, etc. Imminent is defined as "near at hand; impending; on the point of hap-
pening; threatening; menacing; [and] perilous." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990).
Examining the context of Brandenburg, Hess, and Claiborne, it is self-evident that imminent, as
used by the Supreme Court, encompasses the dictionary definition without exception. Thus, in
Claiborne, the fact that violent acts occurred weeks or months later did not satisfy the imminence
requirement and displayed that violence was not likely to occur from the speech. See discussion
infra Part IV.C.
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action at some indefinite future time. '20 ' Because no rational inference
from the stipulation can conclude that the publisher intended to produce
imminent disorder, the book's text cannot be punished. °9
The Rice court, however, completely ignored the imminence require-
ment, stating that it generally poses little obstacle to the punishment of
speech that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting.21° It based its reason-
ing on the fact that "'culpability in such cases is premised, not on defen-
dants' advocacy of criminal conduct, but on defendants' successful efforts
to assist others by detailing to them the means of accomplishing the
crimes."
21'
Nonetheless, this reasoning again focuses on criminal liability guide-
lines inapplicable to the civil context. More importantly, the court proba-
bly failed to address imminence directly because in the context of reading a
book, it unquestionably did not exist.2 12 No reasonable individual could
interpret the book's instructions as intending to incite imminent lawless ac-
tivity. Indeed, Hit Man requires time to read and absorb its information.
Its instructions are thorough and specific, 213 requiring study and patience.
This characteristic entirely negates the notion that the book was intended to
incite imminent murderous acts. Absent any concession to imminence,
Paladin's stipulations alone fail to provide the requisite intent.
Furthermore, the Rice court entirely discounted the plaintiffs' conces-
sions. The plaintiffs conceded that the marketing strategy employed by the
publisher was, in fact, intended to maximize sales of its publications to the
general public.21 4 These concessions included sales of the book to authors
who desire information for the purpose of writing books about crime and
criminals, law enforcement agencies who desire information concerning the
means and methods of committing crimes, persons who enjoy reading ac-
counts of crimes and the means of committing them for purposes of enter-
tainment, persons who fantasize about committing crimes but do not there-
after commit them, and criminologists and others who study criminal
methods and mentality. 215 These stipulations, considered jointly with those
208. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.105, 108 (1973).
209. Id. at 108-09.
210. Rice, 128 F.3d at 246.
211. LId. (quoting DOJ Report, supra note 135, at 37).
212. The context in which information is disseminated is important. See Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976). "[T]he line between permissible advocacy and im-
permissible incitation [sic] to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the
speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say." Id
213. See supra note 98.
214. Rice, 128 F.3d at 242 n.2.
215. Id.
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of Paladin, lead to the conclusion that the marketing efforts and intentions
of the publisher were to sell its book to everyone in the general public
which, unfortunately, includes any murderers or would-be murderers. Yet,
it is the intention of every publisher to have every possible person purchase
its product.
Finally, although Paladin acknowledged that in publishing Hit Man it
assisted in the perpetration of these particular murders, this concession has
no relevance on what the Rice court termed specific intent. Perry not only
committed the acts by his own volition, but also sought out the book at his
own will. The fact that the book actually assisted him in committing the
crime does not necessarily indicate that Paladin intended to assist him.
4. Abstract Advocacy
The Rice court's reasoning with respect to its abstract advocacy dis-
cussion was also flawed. The test in Brandenburg does not require speech
to hold any "instructional communicative value," nor does it consider any
type of value that speech contains. Other tests explicitly consider whether
certain speech contains "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value., 216  However, Brandenburg specifically lacks this criteria. The
standard blindly defends the theories of free speech overviewed in Part
11.217 With respect to abstract advocacy, therefore, the test requires only
that the speech is not aimed at inciting imminent lawless activity.
Hit Man admittedly provides a comprehensive and detailed guide to
murder. Nevertheless, as addressed by the district court, the book at no
point constitutes a "call to action." '218 The author never directs the reader to
commit murder, much less, immediately. Rather, the book simply outlines
what is needed to commit the crime and to avoid being caught. Hit Man is
"the mere abstract teaching.., of the... moral necessity for a resort to
force and violence" as noted in Brandenburg.219 The book outlines the
author's political belief that the professional hit man is needed in society.Y
216. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (outlining one of the factors considered in
testing obscene speech).
217. See discussion supra Part II.A. The theories include the "marketplace of ideas" theory,
the Tolerance and safety-valve theory, Meiklejohnian theory, and the Libertarian theory.
218. Zamora v. Colombia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 204 (1979) (citing Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 322 (1957)).
219. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98
(1961)).
220. FERAL, supra note 7, at ix. "It is my opinion that the professional hit man fills a need
in society .. " Id. However, as Part V will discuss, the book actually is true fiction and ficti-
tious writing. It is therefore questionable whether anything in the book actually portrays the be-
lief of the author.
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It then provides instructions on how to attain this goal. At no time, how-
ever, does the book direct the reader to kill. Lacking such language, the
book at its very essence is what the Rice court itself described as "theoreti-
cal advocacy ' ,221 or "principles divorced from action. ' , 222 This fact, coupled
with Hit Man's initial warning, provides significant evidence that Paladin
aimed to simply publish an informational book. Though ignored by the
court, the warning language states this outright.
C. Brandenburg's Second Prong - Likelihood
Although the court's main conclusion rested in the four areas de-
scribed above, other issues deserve attention. The first covers Branden-
burg's second prong - likelihood. As noted earlier, the standard requires
that imminent lawless activity be likely to occur as a result of an actor's
speech.223 By failing to apply the Brandenburg test, the Rice court ignored
this element. Hit Man was published in 1983.224 Out of the 13,000 copies
sold nationally through 1996, only Perry was known to have actually used
the information. 22 This correlates to less than a one-ten-thousandth of a
percent (.0001%) chance that the book actually incited imminent lawless
activity and strongly suggests that such activity was not likely to occur
from reading this book.
Furthermore, Perry committed the murders one year after receiving
Hit Man. It seems difficult to conclude that a book, without the stresses of
passion and persuasion found in direct speech, would be likely to incite
imminent murderous acts, especially when the acts occurred one year later.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,226 ad-
dressed a somewhat similar situation.227 The Court noted that had any acts
of violence directly followed the strong language, there would have been a
substantial question about whether the speaker could be held responsible.228
However, because the only acts of violence occurred weeks or months
later, the Court found the defendant not liable.229 Thus, Claiborne seemed
221. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249 (quoting Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203, 235 (1961)).
222. Id (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320 (1957)).
223. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
224. FERAL, supra note 7.
225. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848.
226. 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see discussion supra Part II.2.
227. National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
228. Id. at 928; see discussion supra Part II.0.
229. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928.
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to imply that violent acts materializing immediately as a result of speech
could indicate the requisite likeliness to incite imminent lawless activity 230
Although the facts in Claiborne concerned political speech, its appli-
cation to Hit Man is controlling. If direct speech was not found likely to
incite imminent lawless activity when violent acts occurred after weeks or
months, then neither could a book's text, especially when the acts required
study and preparation, and occurred after one year.
D. Rice Creates a Circuit Split
Finally, the Rice court ignored a significant ten year precedent main-
tained by the Fifth Circuit case, Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.231
Though the appellate courts are not required to follow precedent set by
their sister circuits, Rice's failure to even consider or distinguish the case
evidences the court's convoluted reasoning.
1. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
In its August 1981 issue, as part of a series about the pleasures and
dangers of unusual and taboo sexual practices, Hustler Magazine printed
"Orgasm of Death," an article discussing the practice of autoerotic as-
phyxia.232 This technique "entails masturbation while 'hanging' oneself in
order to temporarily cut off the blood supply to the brain at the moment of
orgasm., 233  Though the article described the sexual "high[s]" and
"thrill[s]" of those who engaged in this practice, it repeatedly warned read-
ers that the practice was dangerous, self-destructive and deadly. 234 It stated
that those who successfully performed the practice could achieve intense
physical pleasure, but that the risks involved loss of consciousness and
death by strangulation.235 Indeed, the article itself stated that "the facts
[were] presented.., solely for an educational purpose.
2 36
Tragically, a fourteen year-old adolescent read the article and stran-
gled himself while attempting the practiceY 7 The next morning, the boy's
nude body was found hanging in his closet. 238 A copy of Hustler Maga-
230. FARBER, supra note 24, at 70.
231. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
232. Id. at 1018.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1018-19.
235. Id. at 1019.
236. Id. at 1018.
237. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1019.
238. Id.
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zine, opened to the page of the article, was found near his feet.239 The de-
cedent's mother and close friend sued Hustler to recover exemplary dam-
ages and damages of emotional and psychological harms that they suffered
as a result of the adolescent's death.24 ° In a jury trial considering only in-
citement, the plaintiffs prevailed. 241
The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed and concluded that Brandenburg
protected the magazine article under the First Amendment. 242 For the Her-
ceg court, three main contentions guided its finding that the article could
not incite imminent lawless activity. First, the fact that the article was ex-
tremely detailed failed to prove actual incitement. 243 For the court, simply
considering the act of autoerotic asphyxia was enough to know how to ac-
complish its goal and could not indicate incitement to imminent lawless
activity.244
Second, and probably most important, the Herceg court found that
Brandenburg undermined the plaintiffs' incitement theory.245 The court
stated that incitement cases invoking the Brandenburg test usually con-
cerned state efforts to punish the arousal of crowds to commit criminal ac-
tion. 246 Although the court was unwilling to address whether the written
word could ever be found to create culpable incitement unprotected by the
First Amendment, it found that this article could not form such incite-
ment.247 Important to this issue were the numerous warnings on how the
autoerotic practice produced a threat to life and the seriousness of the dan-
ger.24  The warnings clearly stated that the article was not intended to in-
cite this practice.
Finally, the court considered whether the article was actually pro-
tected by Brandenburg because it involved non-political speech.249 In its
conclusion, followed by the district court in Rice, the court conceded that




242. Id. at 1023-25.





248. Id. at 1023.
249. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023.
250. Id. at 1024.
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2. The Rice Court's Failure to Consider Herceg
In light of Herceg, the Rice court's conclusion was clearly misguided.
Similar to the Hustler article, Hit Man describes the perpetration of murder
and other crimes in explicit detail. 251 However, as the court recognized in
Herceg, detail is not enough.25 2 Simply considering the act of murder, any
reasonable person would know how to accomplish its goal. Violence por-
trayed on television and in movies probably gives average individuals more
guidance than Hit Man itself. Further, as noted in Herceg, it is question-
able whether any type of written material could actually incite a reader to
kill. 53 Books and other written materials take time to read, examine, and
study. 25 Similar to the Hustler article, Hit Man contained two warnings,
both of which included similar words as the Hustler wamings-"For in-
formational purposes only!"255 Moreover, Hit Man's initial warning was
very explicit.256 Finally, as noted by the Herceg court, Brandenburg is not
inherently limited to areas of political speech.257
Although the texts of both Hit Man and the article in Herceg are
similar in style and form, the circumstances of both cases outline the flaws
of the Rice opinion. The Herceg court considered an article in a magazine
that could be found at every newsstand and still did not find liability. In
contrast, Hit Man was available only by mail order at the time of the mur-
ders. Further, in Herceg, a dead boy's body hung above the open page of
the article directing his death. These circumstances directly implied that
the adolescent attempted to perform the act immediately after reading the
article, yet the court would not conclude that this was incitement to immi-
nent lawless activity.258 The Rice court, however, reached a contrary con-
clusion.259 Although Perry received Hit Man one year prior to committing
the murders and did not have it in his direct possession, the court allowed
the possibility for Paladin to be held liable.2 °
Admittedly, the case in Rice maintains some differences that may
have influenced the court to ignore Herceg. Indeed, since the Herceg deci-
251. See supra note 98.
252. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023.
253. Id.
254. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
255. FERAL, supra note 7, at back cover, vi; see discussion supra Part III.B.
256. See FERAL, supra note 7, at vi.
257. Thus, even if the court failed to see Hit Man as the author's political manifesto ad-
dressing the need of the hit man in society, Brandenburg would still apply.
258. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1021.
259. Rice, 128 F.3d at 233.
260. Id.
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sion, society's ills have expanded. For instance, the tragedy in Oklahoma
City and the expanding danger of internet publications have troubled Con-
gress and the Department of Justice. 6' In particular, Paladin's stipulations
of intent weighed heavily in the Rice decision.262 These types of stipula-
tions did not exist and were not at issue in Herceg. Moreover, murder is
without question a lawless activity, while autoerotic asphyxia is questiona-
bly legal. Nevertheless, uniformity in the law should be a paramount goal
for the federal appellate circuits in order to maintain uniform precedent and
provide guidance for lower courts.2 63 Therefore, the Rice court should have
distinguished the Herceg case.
3. The State Courts
Additionally, many state supreme and appellate court decisions dem-
onstrate that Brandenburg can apply to and protect publishers and other
entertainment entities. In Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., a
father whose son was killed by a minor who had attended a showing of the
film The Warriors,266 brought a wrongful death action against Paramount
Pictures, the distributor of the movie.267 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court, ruling for the defendants on summary judgment, stated that while
the film was full of violent scenes, it did not "exhort, urge, entreat, solicit,
or overtly advocate or encourage unlawful or violent activity on the part of
viewers. It [did] not create the likelihood of inciting or producing 'immi-
nent lawless action' that would [have] strip[ped] [it] of First Amendment
1,268protection.
A year earlier, in McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,269 a California appellate
court held that a musician could not be found liable for the words in his
songs.270 In McCollum, plaintiffs sued musician Ozzy Osbourne, and CBS
261. See Prohibition on Dissemination of Information Relating to Explosive Materials for a
Criminal Purpose, S. 735, 104th Cong. § 842 (1996) (proposing an amendment to AEDPA, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)); DOJReport, supra note 135.
262. Rice, 128 F.3d at 248, 252-53.
263. Admittedly, the federal appellate circuits do function autonomously. This is an impor-
tant feature of our justice system because opposing decisions can fuel debate and create further
deliberation, at least until the Supreme Court can address the issue. Nevertheless, as argued, uni-
formity in the law should be a paramount goal.
264. See supra note 83.
265. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
266. THE WARRIORS (Paramount Pictures 1979).
267. Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1067.
268. Id. at 1071.
269. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988).
270. Id.
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Records, Inc. when their son was allegedly inspired to commit suicide
while listening to a song entitled "Suicide Solution., 27' While finding that
there was no intent to produce imminent lawless action, the court reasoned
that the songs did not contain the types of lyrics that could have been char-
acterized as commands to immediate suicidal acts.27 The lyrics, even in
the most literal sense, did not purport to order or command anyone to any
concrete action at any specific time.2
73
Although these cases did not involve any form of "how-to" format or
informational setting similar to Hit Man, they were considered depictions
of violence alleged to have been imitated similar to the subject book. This
makes them inherently similar and their premises identical. 274  Although
the Rice court was not required to consider these cases, their similarities
275deserved attention.
V. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
Joined by numerous entertainment and media conglomerates, includ-
ing many of the major networks, newspapers, and publishers, 276 Paladin
contended that any decision finding liability on behalf of the publisher
would have far-reaching chilling effects on the rights of free speech and
press. 277 This is the slippery slope argument-the idea that once one pub-
lisher is found liable for its work, other forms of speech or media become
increasingly susceptible to regulation. Indeed, it is this pressure that has
fueled the theories discussed in Part 11.278 As a result of this case, the
271. Id. at 191.
272. Id. at 193.
273. Id.
274. The plaintiffs in Rice argued that these types of cases were what are termed "copycat"
or "imitative harm" cases, and thus did not apply, especially in light of Paladin's stipulations of
intent. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 846. Nevertheless, the district court found these cases applicable.
Id. Their premise is identical. In the case of Hit Man, someone read the book and followed its
words, while in these cases the victims watched and listened to the movie and song, respectively,
and followed their actions. Furthermore, neither of the subject articles, that is the book, the
movie, nor the song, directly advocated killing oneself or another.
275. The Rice court actually did address copycat type situations in general, but determined
that broadcasters and other media would never be liable because it would be the rare case that the
broadcaster or publisher actually intended to assist another in committing the crime. Rice, 128
F.3d at 265. However, as reasoned earlier, Paladin did not posses the requisite intent required
under Brandenburg. Therefore, Rice's comparison to the copycat type cases is inherently similar.
276. Among the entities filing as amici curiae were: ABC, America Online, the National
Association of Broadcasters, the Baltimore Sun, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the
Association of American Publishers, the Magazine Publishers of America, and the Newspaper
Association of America.
277. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
278. These theories include the "marketplace of ideas" theory, the Meiklejohnian theory, the
1999] THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S MISTAKE IN RICE V PALADIN 407
Fourth Circuit has triggered a slippery slope against all publishers, film-
makers, and other artists.
A. The Fiction
Prior to examining the widespread effects this case could potentially
bring, and the one it has already brought, it is important to recognize that
Hit Man is plain fiction. The author, Rex Feral,279 was never a professional
hit man. 80 In fact, Feral was a divorced mother of two when she wrote the
book in 1983 .281 She never even owned a gun282 Therefore, the book, al-
though narrated partly in the first person, is in essence, a hoax. This is sig-
nificant because the Fourth Circuit's exhaustive analysis and ultimate deci-
sion creating the possibility of regulating this fictional book, written almost
entirely in satire, has now tilted the liability scale against all publishers.283
B. The Actual Consequences of Rice
The slippery slope has already begun. In Byers v. Edmondson,2 4
Louisiana's First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed a ruling that dismissed a
suit against Time Warner and other affiliate entities responsible for the
movie, Natural Born Killers.285 This suit was filed by relatives of a woman
shot in a convenience store robbery.286 The plaintiffs contended the movie
contained subliminal messages that influenced the couple who committed
the crime. 87 Specifically citing Rice, the Louisiana appellate court sent the
Tolerance theory, and the Libertarian theory. See discussion supra Part II.A.
279. This actually was an alias. See David Montgomery, If Books CouldKill; This Publisher
Offers Lessons in Murder. Now He's a Target Himsel, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at F5.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. Feral originally submitted a novel at the behest of Paladin's editors who wanted a
how-to book. She collected her ideas from books, television, movies, newspapers, police offi-
cers, her karate instructor, and an attorney friend. Id.
283. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 233. It is important to recognize that entertainment mediums are
entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas. See, e.g., Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). Further, works of fiction are constitu-
tionally protected in the same manner as political treatises and topical news stories. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). This is not to say that fictional works cannot cause harm or
do not deserve to be scrutinized under the law. It does imply, however, that because such works
are protected under the Constitution, courts should give deference to publishers in favor of pre-
serving speech.
284. 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998); NATURAL BoRN KILLERS (Warner Bros. 1994).
285. Byers, 712 So. 2d at 681.
286. id. at 683.
287. Id. at 684.
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case back for further discovery. 88 Relying heavily on considerations of
intent, the court remanded the case to discover whether Oliver Stone or
Time Warner actually produced and distributed the movie with the intent to
incite others to kill.
2 89
Admittedly, the Rice court zealously attempted to avoid decisions like
that in the Byers case. The court wrote, "[i]n the 'copycat' context, it will
presumably never be the case that the broadcaster or publisher actually in-
tends, through its description or depiction, to assist another or others in the
commission of violent crime. 2 90 Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Stone
possessed any intent other than to satirically depict the relationship be-
tween television and violence, in addition to attracting many people to
watch his film. However, it is the Byers decision that truly illustrates the
damage created by the Rice appellate court.
Following the Rice decision alone, lawyers now possess a wealth of
opportunity to tailor arguments, and present evidence on notions of intent
or incitement, or based on the persuasiveness of legislative and executive
branch arguments. Considering these elements, courts then become obli-
gated to continue litigation. Although the court in Byers may ultimately
conclude that the First Amendment prevents liability, the possibility now
exists for it to determine otherwise. The First Amendment, however,
should stand to shield these cases outright. As described above, the proper
examination for the Byers court was to consider whether the movie, when
published, was intended and likely to incite imminent lawless activity. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Bose Corp., this can be determined by the
court in its own independent review.291 Considering a movie marketed on
an international scale and lacking any directive language telling the viewer
to go out and kill immediately, the court's decision can be made outright. 2
C. The Possibilities
If the shield of the First Amendment can be eliminated by prov-
ing after publication that an article[, or a book, or a movie] dis-
cussing a dangerous idea.., helped bring about a real injury
simply because the idea can be identified as "bad," all free
speech becomes threatened. An article discussing the nature and
288. Id. at 692.
289. Id.
290. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265 (emphasis in original).
291. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union, 466 U.S. 484, 505 (1984).
292. Although it is impossible to say generally that a movie will never be intended and likely
to incite imminent lawless activity, in the case of Natural Born Killers, this is clear as a matter of
law.
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danger of "crack" usage-or of hand-gliding-might lead to li-
ability just as easily.293
Texts similar to Hit Man have received First Amendment protection
for decades. The Anarchist Cookbook was one of the first books to over-
view and detail methods of dealing death. 2" It contained numerous pas-
sages on drugs, sabotage, lethal weapons, and explosives.2 9' Although the
book is noted for its inaccuracies, 296 sales have totaled over two million
copies since its 1971 release. 297 The Cookbook has always been protected
by the First Amendment. 98 Similarly protected, the Army's 1969 Impro-
vised Munitions BoolO retails in some gun stores.3°  It teaches "how to
make grenade launchers, booby traps, and how to mix laundry soap, alco-
hol, and gasoline to produce a napalm-like firebomb. 30' The future of
these works and many others, however, is now unclear.
The Rice decision inevitably creates the possibility of extending li-
ability to other publishers, television and film producers, the media, and
other artists. Consider The Turner Diaries,3°2 the racist novel with bomb-
making instructions, said to have inspired Timothy McVeigh in the Okla-
homa City Bombing or The Day of the Jackal,03 a novel about attempting
to kill the president of France. These types of publications are now open to
suit. Plaintiffs' lawyers can create arguments by examining their texts and
urging courts to consider both intent and incitement theories.
Other areas are also susceptible to litigation. In France in 1993, a
seventeen year-old boy died from an explosion caused by a home-made
bomb which he made in imitation of a technique shown on MacGyver.3°
A year earlier, also in France, some boys accidentally set their school on
293. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024.
294. WILLIAM POWELL, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK (1971).
295. Id.
296. Ken ShirriM Anarchist Cookbook FAQ (last modified Feb. 3, 1998)
<http://burn.ucsd.edu/-mai/TEXT/aolcookbook-faq.html> (on file with the Loyola of Los An-
geles Entertainment Law Journal).
297. ENT. WKLY., alt.culture: The Anarchists' Cookbook (visited Nov. 17, 1998)
<http://pathfinder.com/altculture/aentries-ew/a/anarchists.htnl>> (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
298. Id.
299. IMPROVISED MUNITIONS BOOK (1969).
300. See Montgomery, supra note 279.
301. Id.
302. ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES (1980).
303. FREDERICK FORSYTH, THE DAY OF THE JACKAL (1971).
304. Marlise Simons, Blaming TV for Son's Death, Frenchwoman Sues, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1993, at 30. Ironically, the series sanctimoniously promoted gun control. Id.
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fire, again imitating the the acts seen on MacGyver. °5 Also in 1993, a five-
year-old Ohio boy who was watching the Beavis and Butthead cartoon on
MTV set a fire that killed his sister after watching Beavis and Butthead say
it was fun to play with matches.3°
Though these cases seem extreme, they possess inherent similarities
with Hit Man. MacGyver presumably established its techniques in a step-
by-step manner. The show presumably never directed its viewers to ex-
plicitly follow its methods on bomb making and probably never directed
anyone to kill outright. Similarly, the Beavis and Butthead cartoon, though
probably not depicted in a "how-to" format, described a dangerous activity
while stating that it was "fun." Following Rice, courts involved in these
types of litigation could field discovery issues on notions of intent, or pro-
vide in depth analysis on whether any of these shows actually consisted of
abstract advocacy or constituted actual incitement. Although admittedly
extreme, with the standard and manner set by the Rice court, litigation of
the most extreme case is definitely possible. Prior to Rice, courts consis-
tently barred these types of suits, usually on First Amendment grounds.30 7
The end is now limitless.
The First Amendment, however, stands to protect such programs and
texts. Regardless of whether these publications are loathsome or harmful,
our society depends on the free and open exchange of ideas, even so-called
bad ideas. These notions promote debate and create opportunities for fur-
ther thought and deliberation. Moreover, no matter what the subject, our
society provides everyone with the right to find out more about it if they so
choose, even if that subject may be considered by some as dangerous or
reprehensible. As Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall once wrote,
"[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling [people], sitting alone in [their]... house, what books
[they] may read or what films [they] may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
[peoplel's minds."
30 8
The Founding Fathers knew this well. They ratified the First
Amendment at the outset of the Bill of Rights, marking its importance for
all time as the first recognized right under the Constitution. "They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think [we]re means
305. Id.
306. Cartoon on MTVBlamed for Fire, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1993, at 30.
307. See supra note 83.
308. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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indispensable to the discovery and spread of... truth; [and] that without
free speech[,] ... discussion would be futile ... .
Finally, it is important for our society to recognize who deserves
punishment. Individuals, like James Edward Perry, break the law by their
own volition. They imitate actions read in books, seen on television, and in
the movies that the majority of the populous simply perceive as entertain-
ment. Society, and most important, courts, should realize this. They
should therefore aim their efforts against those individuals who break the
law at their own will, not at the legitimate producers of information like
publishers, filmmakers, and the media.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his speech during the first Inaugural Address, Thomas Jefferson
stated, that "error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to
combat it.",310  The Rice decision abandoned this fundamental principle.
Aside from its critical errors in analysis and its ignorance of seminal Su-
preme Court standards, the court entirely dismissed the extensive history of
permitting the free, open and competitive dissemination of information and
ideas.
Rather than apply the prominent Brandenburg standard to consider
whether Paladin intended to incite imminent lawless activity and whether
the text of Hit Man was likely to incite such activity, the court succumbed
to pressures from the Justice Department. In doing so, the court found
guidance in Senator Feinstein's failed amendment and in its own misappli-
cation of the Department of Justice report, holding applicable a narrow line
of criminal cases that inherently cannot apply in the civil context.
In conclusion, the court failed to preserve an individual's ability to
deliberate and debate the values of speech, and failed to realize that First
Amendment protection cannot be eliminated from publications even if a
potential hazard exists. Ultimately, the Rice decision tilted the slippery
slope against the First Amendment and against all those who disseminate
precarious information and entertainment to the public.
Gregory Akselrud*
309. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring),
overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
310. Id. at 375 n.2 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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